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SECURITY INFORMATION***USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*****DI/USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-49: SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT****I. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SWEDEN**

A. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's geographic position, with reference to the Baltic Sea and its approaches?

To the northern flank of Europe? To Norway? To Finland?

To air routes? Its terrain and communications?

In any conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, Sweden, because of its geographic position, might find itself in one of the air paths between these two contending powers. In the prosecution of combat air operations both contenders would probably find it imperative at times to overfly Sweden.

The Scandinavian Peninsula, of which Sweden forms the greater part, lies across the most direct air approaches to Western USSR from air bases in North America, Greenland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, or from carriers in the Norwegian Sea. Conversely, it lies athwart the air path from the Soviet bases in the Moscow area to North America, Greenland, Iceland, and most of the British Isles; but is not directly on the routes from the Soviet bases in East Germany and in the Murmansk area. Soviet fighters also might overfly Sweden in attempting to intercept Western bombers approaching the USSR via Sweden.

Because of its position, also, if aligned with the West during hostilities, Sweden should be considered as being an area where air facilities might be located for interception, interdiction, bombardment, reconnaissance, early warning and related air operations.

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From air bases in southern Sweden, the entrance to the Baltic Sea may be controlled, and the main East-West lines of communication through Germany are within easy range. Therefore, if allied with the US and successfully defended against Soviet invasion, Sweden could provide bases: a) for air action against Arctic and Western Russia and Finland, b) for bottling up and attacking Soviet naval forces and merchant shipping in the Baltic and neutralizing enemy naval facilities, and c) for air operations on the flank of all Soviet sea, air and land communications with the great German plain. Sweden is, in short, the nearest to vital Soviet industrial centers of European Russia of all Western democratic countries save Finland.

Conversely, in Soviet hands Sweden would provide air bases, early-warning facilities and other military installations. US air attacks launched from Greenland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, or carriers operating in the North Atlantic and North Sea against the USSR would be hindered. The Soviets would have additional bases from which they could launch air attacks against shipping in the Arctic Ocean, North Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat, and the Baltic Sea, and against land targets in Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

The most important Soviet objective in Scandinavia would probably be the long Atlantic coast of Norway with its strategically located sites for submarine and air bases which could be utilized for mounting attacks against North Atlantic shipping and against the northern US-UK airway (via Iceland). It is possible that the Soviets would attempt to occupy this coast without molesting Sweden by the invasion of Norway direct.

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Control of the entrance to the Baltic depends upon two factors: first, occupation of adjacent land areas, and second, the relative strength of the occupying powers. In a general war with the Allies under present conditions, the Soviets would be in a position to, and would have the capability for, seizing the entrance to the Baltic and thereafter controlling traffic in the Baltic Sea. They would have additional bases from which to launch air attacks upon Allied submarines in the Baltic Sea.

The Soviet use of the Baltic Sea, however, could be harassed by air attacks from southern Sweden, and Soviet air power in the Baltic area could be challenged from Swedish air bases. Western air force deployment in Sweden for action against the Soviet Union would probably have to be limited, however, to moderate forces. They would be faced with a logistical problem, because it would be extremely difficult to furnish supplies for more than a moderate air effort. Such forces would be subject to constant harassment by Soviet short-range aircraft.

The Soviets, if they chose, could deploy large air forces and guided missile launchers on their side of the Baltic. A Soviet determination to overcome the Western air forces in southern Sweden, would render a Western air position in southern Sweden untenable.

The position of any Western air forces in Sweden would be considerably strengthened by the maintenance of other friendly air forces in Norway and possibly Denmark, because they would serve to secure logistical support as well as military operations in depth. The air position of Sweden could further be strengthened by carriers operating in the North Sea and Skagerrak.

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From the economic point of view Sweden may be considered as lying within the area wherein its strategic resources could be made subject to the will of the Soviet Union. This is the usual economic relationship of a small country which borders a large and powerful country with great resources. The implications of this economic relationship would also extend to the military relationship; i.e., in the event of hostilities the smaller power would be confronted with three alternatives: a) to accede to such general strategic requirements as its powerful neighbor may impose; b) to counter the requirements of the larger neighboring power by alignment with another large power; or c) to resist by force the demands of the larger neighboring power.

For instance, during World War II Sweden in reality acceded to the general strategic requirements of Germany, which was the preponderant neighboring power, and thereby avoided fighting the Germans. In a future war situation the Swedes might be confronted with a similar situation with respect to the Soviet Union.

Geographic position causes Sweden to be of appreciable, though not vital, strategic importance to the NATO. This factor of position, together with certain economic and political considerations and a moderate and useful military capability, makes Sweden potentially a valuable ally.

I. C. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's scientific research and development establishments?

The Swedes now maintain an aircraft industry that is capable of producing modern jet aircraft to replace current piston engine types and of supporting the Air Force in its present strength.

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1. The principal center of Swedish aeronautical research and development is the Flygtekniska Försöks Anstalten (FFA) (Air Technical Research Institute, Stockholm). Located at the FFA there is a low speed wind tunnel of 3.6 meters in diameter and 100 miles per hour velocity. There is also a high subsonic 1-meter diameter tunnel designed for operation up to Mach number 1. There are, at present, three supersonic wind tunnels with velocities ranging from Mach numbers of 1.5 to 3.9. They are the intermittent type with test sections of:

24 x 30 cm (9.5 x 12 inches)

16 x 24 cm

8 x 17 cm

2. Although the Kungliga Tekniska Hogskolan (KTH) (Royal Institute of Technology) is primarily an educational institution, it has an active Aeronautical Engineering Department which is provided with well designed aeronautical research facilities and conducts basic research which contributes to the over-all Swedish aeronautical development effort. In addition, to a subsonic wind tunnel, KTH has a 33 x 33 cm supersonic wind tunnel with a Mach number of 1.8. This facility serves both to train students, some of whom will later staff the expanding FFA, and to conduct basic experiments as requested by the Swedish Air Force.

3. Swedish aircraft engine development is conducted at the Svenska Flygmotor AB (SFA). The research laboratory of this firm operates the supersonic facilities which were just completed in 1951. The funds for the research

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facilities are sponsored jointly by Bofors (Swedish Munitions Manufacturers) and the Swedish Air Board. There are three flow generating systems set up in parallel for conducting the following types of experiments:

Jet engine compressor tests

Jet engine combustion tests

Air oil cascade tests

There is also a ballistics wind tunnel which has a test section of 50 x 50 cm (20 inches) with a Mach number range from 1.3 to 3.5. Future planning for the above air generating system includes extension of the ballistics Facility up to Mach number 8.

4. The SAAB aircraft company, located near Linkoping, Sweden, is privately owned but is strongly backed by the government. This company, being the firm which produces all the military aircraft for Sweden, is engaged in some aircraft research and in aircraft and aircraft equipment development on a large scale.

I. D. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's armed forces and military installations? How large and how effective are the Swedish army, navy, and air force? What is the importance of Sweden's military installations and facilities?

The Swedish Air Force has a total of 1,688 aircraft of which 1,095 are assigned to operational units, the remainder being training, transport, miscellaneous aircraft and stored reserves. Of the 1,095 operational aircraft 625

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are fighters, 346 are attack and 124 are reconnaissance aircraft. Of the 625 fighters 311 are jet aircraft. 49 of the attack aircraft are also jet.

The Air Force composition and strength by aircraft type will be found attached and marked "Tab A."

The total personnel on active duty in the Royal Swedish Air Force is 10,630. Of these 536 are officer pilots, 93 are warrant officer and non-commissioned officer pilots, and 269 are enlisted pilots below the rank of sergeant.

Air Force officers are proficient in their various specialized fields, and the officer pilots demonstrate skill in handling aircraft. The reserve and enlisted pilots rank somewhat below the active officer pilots in proficiency. Few, if any, of the pilots have had combat experience. Lack of combat experience would undoubtedly work against them in the early period of any conflict.

The Air Force is considered by Sweden to be its first line of defense against attack. It is estimated that the Air Force in an emergency could mobilize, disperse and be ready for limited action within 72 hours. Complete reliance on imports of fuel would undoubtedly prove a limiting factor in a total mobilization. Most fields have POL storage for only one day of full-scale operations. The seriousness of this factor is recognized by Sweden, and the POL storage facilities are being built up by the use of old mines for underground storage, but this is a slow process which cannot reach significant proportions for several years unless given higher priority.

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The receipt and employment of electronic early-warning equipment from the US and UK has greatly improved the defensive potential of the Air Force.

Vampire jets from England continue to replace piston-engined fighters in units, and a small number of J-29 jets (only Swedish aircraft with performance comparable to the early models of the Soviet MIG-15) are coming into service.

The basic mission of the Air Force is to utilize the air arm in an interceptor capacity in the event of an attack on Sweden.

The Swedish petroleum situation is probably the most critical of all logistic support items. Sweden imports between 90 and 94 percent of her petroleum needs. In combat, the Air Force would be dependent almost completely on the importation of petroleum products. In the event of attack, the Air Force would be capable of making a vigorous initial defense against an enemy with comparable strength and equipment, but would be unable to support a sustained effort against a major air campaign without outside help.

Sweden has no naval air arm.

Sweden has a total of 62 airfields. Of the 62 airfields, 6 can sustain medium bomber and jet fighter operations as well as limited heavy bomber operations; 4 can sustain jet fighter operations and have a potential for heavy and medium bomber operations; 10 can sustain piston-engined fighters, light transports and limited jet fighter operations. Of the nine seaplane stations, 5 have complete facilities. List of airfield and seaplane stations will be found attached and marked "Tab B."

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II. PRESENT SWEDISH POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

F. In what circumstances, if any, might Sweden join the NATO or, at least, cooperate in Western military planning? What would be the effect on Sweden's attitude of the addition of Germany to NATO? Soviet assumption of control over Finland? Substantial growth of Western military strength? Need for military equipment? A Soviet attack on a NATO member?

It seems extremely doubtful that Sweden will forsake her policy of neutrality and join NATO, either now or in the foreseeable future. However, Sweden might, under certain circumstances, be brought unofficially into Western military planning on a limited scale. Sweden might be persuaded that it is to her best interests to participate in this planning with prime emphasis on the defense of the Scandinavian area. If the Swedes were to accept such a premise, they would insist that their participation in this planning be accomplished within their own concept of "neutrality;" that it would extend to purely military planning matters and would not necessarily involve joint military training, command, tactics, etc.; that it would not involve a direct Swedish commitment outside its own borders but would emphasize Scandinavian defense; and that it would be unofficial.

Factors influencing either or both of the above decisions would be:

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- 1) A Soviet-sponsored attack upon Yugoslavia or overt Communist aggression in the Middle or Far East would probably not induce the Swedes to enter NATO so long as such an attack were successfully localized. However, informal Swedish military discussions with the West on joint Scandinavian defense might be hastened thereby.
- 2) The addition of West Germany to NATO (or a comparable Western defense force) would be looked upon with favor by Sweden, but probably would have little or no influence upon her ingrained reluctance to enter a NATO "alliance." The addition of West Germany to NATO might, however, encourage the Swedes to adjust their "neutrality" to the extent necessary to permit unofficial joint military planning--the Swedes would insist, however, upon limiting such discussions to the defense of the Scandinavian area and perhaps of the North German Baltic area. In this latter instance the Swedes would be cooperative up to a point, with the degree of cooperation dependent upon their own peculiar interpretation of "neutrality."
- 3) Soviet assumption of control over Finland, particularly if accomplished by the use of military force and resistance by the Finns, would have an electric effect upon the people and Government of Sweden. The Swedes were deeply influenced by the Prague coup in 1948 which served as a catalytic agent in persuading the Swedish Government that stronger measures against internal Communist threats were required.

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Soviet occupation of Finland might well persuade Sweden to turn decisively toward the West and join NATO; certainly as a minimum effect, the placement of Finland wholly behind the "iron curtain" would force Sweden to re-examine her entire "alliance free" policy, and would almost certainly have the effect of bringing Sweden closer to the West, at least in certain phases of military planning.

- 4) During the past year the growth of Western military strength has pleased the Swedes and they have acknowledged that this growth contributes to their own defense. However, such a growth even though continuous would not in itself influence the Swedes to join NATO since they believe, in essence, that this Western strength will be available to them in a crisis without the necessity of sacrificing their present policy of neutrality. Continued growth of Western strength might, however, induce the Swedes to participate in joint unofficial planning with the idea of making such Western strength more effective in the Scandinavian Peninsula.
- 5) Sweden's requirements for certain strategic military equipment from the West and the receipt of such equipment will not necessarily persuade the Swedes that they should join NATO, nor may it be assumed that Swedish participation in joint unofficial military planning will necessarily follow. The Swedes hope to receive, and will accept, such

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equipment more as a "right" which is due them as one of the forward areas of Western defense, and less as an "obligation" which would entail Swedish participation in NATO or even formal military planning.

6) A Soviet attack upon a NATO member would bring Sweden closer to NATO only as such an attack were made upon a NATO neighbor (i.e., Norway, Denmark and possibly the UK). As in the case of a USSR occupation of Finland, much would depend upon Soviet assurances to Sweden at the time of the attack and the steps taken by other nations, principally the US, to assist the specific NATO member attacked. In the event of a Soviet assault upon Turkey or Greece, the Swedes would not feel it incumbent upon themselves to draw closer to NATO. In either case, however, it might be expected that Sweden would move closer at least toward a policy of joint unofficial planning on Scandinavian defense.

In summation, it would appear that: 1) Sweden is unlikely to alter her "alliance free" policy and join NATO either now or in the foreseeable future; 2) the possibility for such a fundamental change, however, appears to be directly proportionate to the magnitude and locale of Soviet overt action in the future. Soviet occupation of Finland or Soviet attack upon a neighboring nation might well induce the Swedes to actively participate in NATO. Such a development would

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be conditioned upon Soviet attitudes and actions, at that time, towards Sweden; 3) the possibility of Swedish participation in joint unofficial Western planning, although somewhat slim, appears to be more likely than actual Swedish membership in NATO--provided such planning is unofficial and limited to Scandinavian defense; 4) Sweden's principal objective under all circumstances will be to maintain her neutral "alliance free" policy as long as possible.

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III. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF SWEDEN'S POSITION

A. During the Cold War.

- 1. Does nonadherence to the NATO impair Sweden's defense capabilities? Is Western aid in terms of military supplies essential?**

Sweden's nonadherence to NATO impairs her defense capabilities to the following extent:

- a. Precludes joint planning on over-all Western European defense;**
- b. Prevents Sweden gaining an equal priority with other Western European nations on strategic defense items such as radar and communication needs;**
- c. Excludes Sweden from the beneficial effects of joint NATO operations --air, ground and sea;**
- d. Denies to Sweden the results of Western military research and development;**
- e. Excludes Sweden from participating in the exchange of country-to-country military personnel;**
- f. Denies Sweden the opportunity to take advantage of modern military training methods based upon combat experience; and finally**
- g. Denies to Sweden effective assurance that a greatly strengthened coalition of Western nations will come to her assistance in the event of Soviet aggression.**

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The essentiality of Western aid hinges upon the purpose to which it is related. If the purpose is defined as Swedish ability to defend itself against armed attack by the USSR, Sweden requires more Western military supplies than it is now receiving. This need, however, is not for funds to purchase but for the right to purchase high-priority items such as radar and communication equipment and late-model jet aircraft from the US or other NATO nations. If the purpose is defined as Sweden's ability to protect itself against a Soviet-inspired coup or to resist Soviet political and economic pressures during the cold war, Sweden does not necessarily require Western aid in terms of military supplies beyond present commercial arrangements.

3. Would Sweden's adherence to the NATO, prior to possible hostilities, produce important military benefits for the West? Might it provoke reprisals by the Soviet bloc against Sweden? Might it raise a threat to Finland's independence? Might it increase East-West tension?

Sweden's adherence to NATO, prior to possible hostilities, would produce important military benefits for the West. Such adherence would:

- a. Permit coordinated planning for the defense of the Scandinavian area;
- b. Advance NATO frontiers to the East, thus providing air bases along the USSR's Baltic periphery for interdiction, interception, reconnaissance, etc.;

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- c. Permit closer Western naval air and surface surveillance and interdiction in the Baltic;
- d. Add to the sum total of NATO military strength the personnel and equipment of one of the best air forces in Western Europe;
- e. Create a military buffer zone conducive to a more effective defense of Norway, Denmark, the North German Plain and the UK;
- f. Provide increased quantitative and qualitative intelligence on Soviet capabilities.

Sweden's adherence to NATO, prior to possible hostilities, would not necessarily provoke military reprisals by the Soviet bloc. It is probable that the USSR would issue an extremely strong statement castigating the Swedes for taking such action and warning them of the consequences. There is no reason to believe that such a statement would necessarily be followed by direct military action against Sweden, unless, of course, at the time of such Swedish affiliation the Soviets had, in a larger context, decided to initiate military hostilities on a broad basis.

Sweden's adherence to NATO would not necessarily raise any additional threat to Finnish independence, despite the fact that the Swedes like to delude themselves by arguing that their own "neutrality" protects the Finns from the USSR. In reality, Finnish survival depends solely on actions by the USSR, actions which will be taken within the context of over-all Soviet strategy regardless of whether or not the Swedes join NATO. It might be

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noted that the Soviets "threatened" Turkey on the occasion of its adherence to NATO, but took no military action against neighboring Iran--or anywhere else.

Any substantial addition to either the Soviet bloc or the Western Allies in the way of political, economic or military benefits naturally increases East-West tension. The addition of Sweden to NATO, therefore, would increase such tension. Such increase, however, should not be used as an argument to nullify the effectiveness of Sweden's contribution to NATO. A principal Western objective is to build the defensive strength of Western Europe, and in doing so there will inevitably be periods of increased tension. Sweden's adherence to NATO should not be looked upon as a special case but rather as one of several steps to strengthen the West, somewhat like German rearmament, Turkish membership in NATO, acquisition of Spanish bases, etc., all of which tend to cause increased tension.

B. In Event of General War.

1. What would be the advantages and disadvantages to the USSR and the West of preserving Swedish neutrality?

Would Western military operations be seriously hampered, and those of the Soviets facilitated by a neutral Sweden? What would be the Swedish reaction to the overflight of belligerent aircraft? Would respect of Swedish neutrality seriously complicate Soviet attacks on Norway and Denmark?

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How would the approaches to the Baltic Sea be affected?

The northern flank of Europe? Air routes and other communications? What would Sweden's value be for intelligence purposes?

The Swedes have several times in the past indicated that although they would officially protest the overflight of US or other Western aircraft, they would not actively resist these overflights. Such protests on a governmental level would probably be relatively mild unless the Soviets placed extreme pressure upon the Swedes to adopt a firmer stand. In some instances it is probable that the Swedish Air Force, even though it remained officially neutral, would offer covert assistance to Western aircraft which might be lost or disabled enroute to or from bombing targets in the USSR. Likewise, the Swedes have in several instances indicated that they would actively resist any encroachments on their neutrality from the East such as overflight of Soviet aircraft en route to possible bombing targets in the UK or the US. It should be noted that in the matter of overflight of Western aircraft the Swedish military, particularly the Air Force, would tend to be more lenient in practice than the Swedish Government, itself, might be in its official position.

The advantages to the West of preserving Swedish neutrality would include: a) denial to the Soviet Union of the use of military bases in Sweden; b) denial to the Soviets of early-warning information from Swedish

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territory of probable overflights by US aircraft engaged in bombing assaults against the USSR, unless obtained clandestinely; c) the certainty of friction between Sweden and the USSR over any Soviet flights over Swedish territory, with the possibility that Swedish aircraft would attack such Soviet planes while leaving US planes unattacked.

The disadvantages to the West of preserving Swedish neutrality would include: a) Sweden would provide strategic materials and manufactured items to the Soviets; b) denial to the West of the opportunity of using Swedish bases and air installations; c) possible denial to the West of early-warning information on Soviet flights over Swedish territory; d) denial to the West of the overt assistance and active participation of the Swedish Air Force.

Western military operations would not be seriously hampered by a neutral Sweden. It is believed that Western overflights of Sweden would not be hampered at all, provided the Swedes adopt the policy they have indicated of not actively resisting such overflights. However, Western operations in the defense of Norway and Denmark would be slightly hampered by lack of depth due to the inability to operate from Swedish bases, and to use Swedish early-warning services. Any future Western offensive move up the Baltic would also be hampered somewhat by lack of bases in Sweden and by the nonparticipation of Swedish armed forces.

Soviet military operations would be facilitated by a neutral Sweden to the extent that the Soviets would be able to obtain advantages from Sweden

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without fighting for them. The gain would be in economizing military forces. The USSR would be able to obtain strategic raw materials and manufactured goods from a neutral Sweden without the expenditure of any military forces. The defense of the Russian heartland would not require a Swedish campaign. However, the defense of European Russia against Western aircraft overflying Sweden would be hampered.

Swedish neutrality would not seriously complicate Soviet attacks on Norway and Denmark. On the contrary, it would favor such attacks for the following reasons:

- a. No risks involved in a campaign against a sizable ground army and a well equipped air force.
- b. No necessity for keeping occupation troops tied down.
- c. Continuing trade with Sweden which might be denied by the destruction of vital installations in an invasion.
- d. There would be no obstruction to communication or transportation to Denmark and Norway, since this could be accomplished north through East Germany or south through Finland or through the Baltic Sea.

The approaches to the Baltic Sea and the northern flank of Europe would be available to the Soviets and in no way would they be affected by Sweden's neutrality. Air routes and other communications may lead northward from Eastern Germany to Denmark and Norway without overflying Sweden, or from the north from Murmansk through Finland.

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If Sweden were permitted to remain neutral by the warring powers, and if she maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with the belligerents, Sweden would become an intelligence-gathering area of some importance to both the West and the USSR. It seems probable that Sweden's value for intelligence purposes might be higher for the West than for the Soviets. Western agents would probably be able to operate within Sweden relatively unhampered by the Swedish Government or people. Communist agents, on the other hand, would undoubtedly be confronted with an unfriendly people and government and with tightened Swedish security measures against foreign spies. From a strictly Air Force point of view a neutral Sweden would be suitable for the employment of agents by both sides to radio news of overflights of Swedish territory by aircraft of the other side. In this activity, certain of the Western areas, particularly the United States, Canada and Iceland, would have an advantage in that such notification would probably occur several hours prior to an attack. The Soviets, however, would not have as great a time advantage in receiving warnings of Western air attacks.

2. Could the USSR force the Swedes to join or capitulate to them without a direct attack? If not, would they be likely to respect Swedish neutrality or would they use military force against Sweden? If so, would consequent Soviet domination of the Baltic Sea and

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the Northern European flank critically affect the main battle in Europe? Would Swedish forces conceivably fight against the Western Powers?

It seems unlikely that the USSR could force the Swedes to join or capitulate to them without a direct attack.

In the event of general war the USSR probably would respect Swedish neutrality--at least during the early stages of the conflict. In the first place, Soviet military operations would not be seriously handicapped by observing Swedish neutrality and, in the second place, the Soviets would avoid certain disadvantages which an attack upon Sweden would entail. The Soviets could launch attacks against the North American Continent, both from the Murmansk area and from Eastern Germany, without overflying Swedish territory. If the Soviet Union were successful in its campaigns against Denmark and Norway, it would be almost as free to operate in the Baltic Sea area with Sweden as a neutral as it would be if Sweden were a conquered enemy. Furthermore, the type of neutrality which Sweden would probably observe would not materially restrict its trade with the Soviet Union and the European Satellites.

An attack upon Sweden would have the following disadvantages for the USSR. Significant portions of the Soviet military forces would have to be devoted to the campaign. In the process of conquering Sweden, it would be necessary to destroy some of Sweden's industry, the products of which the

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Soviets, under conditions of neutrality, can obtain by trade. After conquering Sweden, the USSR would have to station occupation forces there. Finally, if and when the Soviet campaigns against the Western Powers had isolated a neutral Sweden, the USSR could proceed against Sweden militarily or otherwise as the Kremlin might desire, regardless of prior observance of Sweden's neutrality.

If the Soviets used military force against Sweden, thereby gaining domination of the Baltic Sea and their Northern European flank, they would possess additional strategic advantages. The USSR would have additional air and naval bases which could be utilized for submarine, surface vessel and air attacks on North Atlantic shipping lanes. Mining operations in the North Sea and against all major ports in the British Isles would be facilitated. In addition, the Western Powers would be denied the use of the area for fighter bases and anti-aircraft and early-warning sites. Such Soviet control also would deny to the Western Powers an important invasion route to Northern Europe and would prevent a buildup of forces in the Scandinavian countries for such an invasion. Whether all these factors would critically affect the main battle in Europe would depend upon the Soviets' ability to secure in a similar manner the other invasion routes to Europe and also how effective Western air power would be in accomplishing its role against the USSR and/or occupied countries. German domination of the Northern European flank and the Scandinavian countries did not prove decisive in World War II, and although Soviet domination of this area would be extremely disadvantageous

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to the Western Powers if they wished to make a ground invasion of Northern Europe, such domination would not necessarily be critical (i.e., decisive) to the main battle in Europe.

Swedish forces as presently constituted would not fight against the Western Powers. However, after a Soviet invasion and occupation of Sweden, it is possible that some small numbers of military personnel could be persuaded to form a Satellite security force. It is not probable that the Soviets would be able to find enough individuals with adequate military training to be used against the Western Powers. It seems more likely that the few individuals who would collaborate with the Soviets would be utilized almost entirely for security purposes.

3. What would be the military consequences of a Swedish decision to voluntarily enter the war on the side of the West?

The principal military consequences of a Swedish decision to enter the war on the side of the West would be:

- a. Integration of Swedish military forces into NATO Regional Commands in so far as previous joint planning permitted;
- b. Immediate attack by the Soviets, utilizing those reserve forces available in the area;
- c. Active military assistance and support from the West to the extent made possible by previous military plans and commitments in the other battle areas of Western Europe;

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- d. Provide strategic air bases, aircraft, and personnel of the Swedish Air Force for utilization in Western offensive or defensive operation;
 - e. A substantial Soviet commitment in an area which the Soviets had regarded as neutralized; and
 - f. Strengthening of NATO forces in Scandinavia and consequent improvement in the ability of NATO to successfully defend the Scandinavian area.
4. Assuming that the USSR attacked Sweden, how effective would Swedish resistance be, and what would be the consequences on the course of the war? Could Sweden's military effort affect the main battle in Europe favorably for the West? Would it draw off Soviet forces otherwise employed elsewhere? Would Sweden's military facilities be of use to the NATO forces? Would they possibly attempt to flee to the West in order to join "liberation" forces?

If Sweden were attacked by the USSR, effective Swedish resistance would depend in large measure upon outside support. The Swedish Air Force operating on its own would be beset by the following difficulties: a) lack of POL supplies for a sustained campaign; b) difficulty of acquiring military supplies and equipment from the outside; c) superiority of Soviet aircraft over present Swedish aircraft; and d) a lack of combat experienced pilots.

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Sweden's military effort, in case of an attack by the USSR, would affect the main battle in Europe to only a very small degree, unless military planning between the Swedes and Western forces had been previously coordinated. It is doubtful that Sweden's military effort would draw off Soviet forces employed elsewhere, since in making such an attack the Soviets would take into consideration the degree of Swedish resistance. Sweden's military facilities would be extremely valuable to NATO forces, but their utilization would be limited to some degree by the probable preponderance of Soviet air power over the Scandinavian area, leading to the denial of logistic support for NATO forces. In case Sweden were defeated, remaining portions of the Air Force would probably flee first to Norway and then to Britain in order to join liberation forces.

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